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Abstract
We consider the explicit introduction of firms’ choice of location to Var-
ian’s model of sales for a two-stage spatial competition model based on a
standard Hotelling’s linear city model. This model is the formalization of
Varian’s model of sales in the context of Hotelling’s spatial competition.
We obtain three main results. First, we show that there exists a symmet-
ric subgame perfect equilibrium in which each firm chooses a symmetric
mixed strategy equilibrium profile. This equilibrium includes symmetric
location pairs and asymmetric location pairs. Second, the equilibrium
behaviors in our model are randomized at both location and price stages.
Third, we show that expected profits in a subgame perfect equilibrium
are equal to the maximum monopoly profit. Thus, even when product
differentiation is explicitly introduced into a Varian-type model, Varian’s
implication can be retained; the opportunity for profit in an informed
market is lost with competition.
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1 Introduction
According to classical theory, temporary price discounts, popularly known as
sales, should not occur in a market at equilibrium. However, Varian (1980) pro-
posed a model in which such sales can occur in equilibrium in the form of a mixed
strategy. This equilibrium price dispersion is widely known for the phenomenon
of breaking the law of one price. A key assumption of Varian’s model is that
some consumers preferentially buy from particular firms without considering
other firms; whether such a consumer purchases a unit of goods is determined
solely by comparing that consumer’s reserve price to the preferred firm’s of-
fered price. As a consequence, goods from different firms may be physically
identical but may not be identical from the perspective of some consumers. In
Varian’s model, the heterogeneity among products is generated by asymmetric
information: some consumers possess information on the presence of a product
that others do not possess. In this article, we present a generalization of Varian
(1980) with product differentiation in an explicit way, which is the same as in
a spatial competition model of D’Aspremont et al (1979). In other words, we
explicitly introduce a firm’s choice of location to Varian’s model and explore a
two-stage game with spatial competition based on a standard Hotelling linear
model, (Hotelling 1929).
In our study, we define Varian’s model of sales as a model that belongs to a
group of Hotelling’s location price competition model. Considering the example
of Apple fans or members of airlines’ FFP (Frequently Flyer Programs), some
enthusiastic consumers seek to support a firm’s market power. With this type
of purchasing behavior, price discrimination between informed and uninformed
consumers is a typical economics issue. In oligopoly pricing models, Salop and
Stiglitz (1977) and Varian (1980) developed the earliest successful models, which
analyzed equilibrium price dispersion in this market structure. Varian focused
on inter-temporal changes in price at one firm using mixed strategy. In this
article, we analyze a horizontal product differentiation in Varian’s model of
sales. This motivation is reflected in two structures of our model.
First, as in a Hotelling linear model, consumers in our model are also located
on a line segment. However, in our model, consumers are located on three points
in the [0,1] interval: both opposite endpoints and the mid-center. We consider
a duopoly model. Each firm is monopolist to the consumer group at each end,
0 and 1. In contrast, both firms compete for the consumers at the mid-center.
In other words, as in Varian’s model, consumers in our model are exogenously
assigned to groups: group 1 consumers will only buy from firm 1; group 2
consumers will only buy from firm 2; group 3 consumers will buy from either
firm 1 or firm 2 depending on which offers the highest net utility. This structure
corresponds to the setting of consumer type in Varian’s model of sales. For ease
of reference, we call these groups 1-uninformed, 2-uninformed, and informed
switchers; 1-uninformed and 2-uninformed consumers will collectively be called
uninformed consumers or its fans.
Second, as in a spatial competition model, in our model, firms control two
product characteristics: location and price, and each consumer incurs a trans-
2
portation cost quadratic on the distance from the firm. Each consumer has a
reservation price known to the firms and receives utility from the purchase equal
to the reserve less the price and transport cost. Furthermore, in our model, each
firm chooses its product characteristic near and within a territory where it fits
relatively to its uninformed. Firm 1 chooses its location within [0,1/2] and firm 2
chooses its location within [1/2,1], because this model is symmetric with respect
to the center at which informed switchers locate. From Varian’s point of view,
our settings will be interpreted as follows. When the uninformed consumers
at either side move to the other side beyond the mid-center, they should be
charged for their move with charges that exceed the limit amount of their reser-
vation utility (willingness to pay). In other words, Varian’s result depends on
the assumption that at least some consumers are not loyal to a particular firm,
and they are indifferent to price information offered by firms. In brief, Varian’s
model implies symmetric patterns of horizontal product differentiation derived
from the consumers’ preferences described above. In contrast to Varian’s model,
our model analyzes product differentiation between firms’ products. Therefore,
goods are heterogeneous even if all consumers know all of the information about
the products such as price and other factors.
In this article, we obtain three main results. First, we show that there exists a
subgame perfect equilibrium in which the firms’ strategies are symmetric across
the mid-center of the line. In the equilibrium, each firm randomly chooses its
location. Consequently, various equilibrium location patterns are realized. For
example, this mixed-strategy equilibrium includes two typical positions, each
firm at either end of the interval (maximum differentiation) and one with both
firms at the center (minimum differentiation). In addition, this equilibrium
includes symmetric location pairs and asymmetric location pairs.
Second, the equilibrium behaviors in our model are randomized at both
location and price stages. This equilibrium in price subgame is typically called
price dispersion, which is well known for the equilibrium in Varian’s model of
sales. However, we consider the equilibrium given explicit location choice. This
result shows that the equilibrium price dispersion shown by Varian is not only
limited to symmetric location pairs but also extended to asymmetric location
pairs.
Moreover, we obtain a result that location choice is also randomized, in other
words, equilibrium location is also dispersed in a subgame perfect equilibrium.
Our result implies that differentiation between products would also be random-
ized; that is, the same as the case with price shown by Varian. The cause of
“dispersion” of product differentiation is quite different from the cause of price
dispersion. In the last section, we discuss this in detail.
Third, we show that expected profits in a subgame perfect equilibrium are
equal to the maximum monopoly profit. The equilibrium profit of each firm is
equal to a reservation value of each firm’s uninformed consumer. This result is
the same as Varian’s equilibrium profit. Our model can be regarded as explicitly
introducing product differentiation choice into Varian’s sales model so that the
result of firms’ profits in a subgame perfect equilibrium in our model is the same
as the result Varian showed for price competition only. In other words, this result
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shows that Bertrand’s law on the loss of opportunity to gain excess profit in a
competitive market still appears even when locational differentiation is explicitly
considered. In the last section, we also discuss these results, particularly focusing
on the dispersion at both location and price choices.
Our analysis proceeds as follows. We construct a two-stage game: firms
choose a location in the first stage and a price in the second stage. We solve this
game by backward induction. We analyze price competition on a location-pair
subgame. We obtain a mixed strategy equilibrium in the pricing subgame for
any pair of locations. Then, we analyze a subgame perfect location equilibrium
in the first stage. Finally, in the concluding remarks, we discuss in detail the
relationships between Varian’s model and pay-off discontinuity in Hotelling’s
game.
1.1 Literature
In our model, we modify a two-stage spatial competition model of D’Aspremont
et al. (1979) incorporating the elements of Varian’s model of sales (Varian
1980). We consider a model that incorporates a spatial competition framework
a` la Hotelling, where firms compete in price and location, into Varian’s model
of sales. We address both sides, that is, from Varian’s model and Hotelling’s
model. This section reviews the literature on Hotelling.
In the context of a spatial competition model, based on Hotelling’s “Main
Street Model,” firms’ choice of location in an equilibrium involves the opposite
of two extreme results, minimum and maximum differentiation.
Typically, a firm’s choice of location depends on the severity of the price com-
petition. It is possible that firms are agglomerated if the pressure of price com-
petition is relaxed effectively by some means. We introduce three approaches
other than the approach that we developed, which provide the result of agglom-
eration in the context of spatial competition.
The first approach is firms’ collusive behavior with bargaining. For example,
if firms establish a cartel and then maintain a higher price than the competitive
price, the degree of locational differentiation is minimized. Jehiel (1992) exam-
ined this implication in an infinite horizon setting where, in the initial period,
the firms choose their location and, in subsequent periods, charge the Nash bar-
gaining solution prices. Then, in the unique equilibrium, both firms are located
at the center of the market. Friedman and Thisse (1993) also presented a similar
model where firms infinitely repeat bargaining in a price subgame and showed
that the degree of differentiation is minimized. Matsumura and Matsushima
(2011) showed that introducing a cost difference between two firms causes ag-
glomeration to disappear in a collusive equilibrium. Roth and Zhao (2003) have
also shown another result derived from either egalitarian or Kalai-Smorodinski
bargaining solutions. The authors showed that there is a continuum of symmet-
ric equilibria where the firms locate apart from each other.
In the second approach, firms compete in a multi-dimensional space. Irmen
and Thisse (1998) showed that in the location game with n characteristics,
firms choose to maximize differentiation for the dominant characteristic and to
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minimize differentiation for the other characteristics. Prior to Irmen and Thisse,
in the context of a spatial competition model with quadratic transportation
costs, Tabuchi (1994) extended this theory to a two-dimensional model. Then,
Ansari et al. (1998) analyzed a three-dimensional model. Economides (1986)
also studied a two-dimensional characteristic space model. Aoyagi and Okabe
(1993) analyzed a two-dimensional model using a numerical analysis method.
In the third approach, Anderson et al. (1992) applied a discrete choice
model to the spatial competition model. De Palma et al. (1985) showed that
this model derives various types of location pairs in an equilibrium. This model
implies that each firm can capture consumers from every point on the line.
Because of this, severe competition will not arise even as firms move closer to
each other, thereby giving firms the incentive to agglomerate at the center of
the line. This can be considered an attempt to extend a consumer’s behavior
on the Hotelling linear model.
Additionally, in our model, a pay-off function is continuous in the location
game but, on the other hand, it is discontinuous in the price subgame. The
pay-off discontinuity at a price subgame is widely discussed in this literature.
Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) showed that a mixed strategy equilibrium at price
subgame exists for this type of location-price competition. Given this result,
Osborne and Pitchik (1986, 1987) calculated a subgame perfect location point
for this type of game. Bester et al. (1996), Matsumura and Matsushima (2009),
and Eaton and Tweedle (2012) also analyzed a mixed strategy equilibrium on
Hotelling’s location game. Caplin and Nalebuff (1991) showed that quadratic
transportation cost is a sufficient condition for the existence of a pure strategy
equilibrium.
2 The Model
In our model, there are three types of consumers, C1, C2, C3, whose preferences
are represented by the interval [0, 1]. C1’s ideal point of preference is 0. C2’s
ideal point of preference is 1. Ci is a fan of Firm i(= 1, 2). C3 evaluates either
firm’s products. C3’s ideal point of preference is at an equal distance from the
fans of each firm, that is, at 1/2 in [0, 1]. Now we assume symmetry, that is,
an equal density of consumers exists at 0 and at 1. We normalize the density of
consumers at 0 and at 1 as 1 and set the density of consumers at 12 as x. We
assume x ≥ 1. Each consumer Ck (k = 1, 2, 3) purchases one unit of the product
from either one of the two firms.
Both firms choose their own location on interval [0, 1]. zi denotes the location
of firm i. pi denotes the price of the firm’s product. We assume 0 ≤ z1 ≤ 1/2 ≤
z2 ≤ 1. Each firm i chooses its own location and, then, chooses a price for the
product.
We normalize as 1 the reservation value of a product that is sold by a firm
patronized by C1 and C2. Then, we define y as C3’s reservation value for a
product of firm i (i = 1, 2). Consumer Ci evaluates the product of firm 3− i at
0. The distance between each consumer’s ideal point and the location of a firm
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measures the consumer’s disutility. In our model, this disutility is measured
with the quadratic cost function.1
C3 prefers a product with a lower price including transportation costs. We
define each consumer’s utility when the consumer purchases a product with the
characteristic zi at pi as follows. Every consumer chooses their behavior to
maximize their utility. 

uC1 = 1− {p1 + z
2
1},
uC2 = 1− {p2 + (1 − z2)
2},
uC3 = y − {pi + (
1
2 − zi)
2}
(1)
Now, we consider each consumer’s choice and each firm’s profit in a price
subgame given the pair (z1, z2). Each firm i’s profit is defined by the sum of
profit gained from Ci and C3. Here, we assume that production cost is 0. We
consider Firm 1’s profit. C2 does not purchase a product from Firm 1. Let
pi1(p1, p2) denote Firm 1’s profit. pi1(p1, p2) is the total sum of pi
C1
1 (p1), which
denotes Firm 1’s profit gained from C1 and pi
C3
1 (p1, p2), which denotes Firm 1’s
profit gained from C3.
pi1(p1, p2) = pi
C1
1 (p1) + pi
C3
1 (p1, p2). (2)
First, we define piC11 (p1). By (1), C1 purchases Firm 1’s product when 1 −
{p1 + z
2
1} ≥ 0 is satisfied. Therefore, we obtain p1 ≤ 1 − z
2
1 . Now, we define
Firm 1’s profit obtained from C1 as follows.
piC11 (p1) =
{
p1, if p1 ≤ 1− z
2
1 ,
0, otherwise
(3)
Next, we define piC31 (p1, p2). We define C3’s utility, u
C3 , as follows.
uC3 =


y − {p1 + (
1
2 − z1)
2}, if buy from 1,
y − {p2 + (
1
2 − z2)
2}, if buy from 2,
0, otherwise.
Here, we find that C3 purchases only Firm 1’s product when the following two
equations are satisfied, p1+(1/2− z1)
2 < p2+(1/2− z2)
2, p1+(1/2− z1)
2 ≤ y.
It follows that
p1 < p2 + (1/2− z2)
2 − (1/2− z1)
2, p1 ≤ y − (1/2− z1)
2.
Then, again, C3 is divided equally between Firm 1 and Firm 2 when C3 is
indifferent between choosing either Firm 1’s or Firm 2’s product, p1 + (1/2 −
z1)
2 = p2 + (1/2− z2)
2 ≤ y.
1In what follows, we sometimes call this “transportation cost.”
6
Now, we define piC31 , which denotes a firm’s profit obtained from C3, as
follows.
piC31 (p1, p2) =


p1x, if p1 < p2 + (
1
2 − z2)
2 − (12 − z1)
2 and p1 ≤ y − (
1
2 − z1)
2,
p1
1
2x, if p1 = p2 + (
1
2 − z2)
2 − (12 − z1)
2 and p1 ≤ y − (
1
2 − z1)
2,
0, otherwise
(4)
Substituting (3) and (4) with (2), we obtain Firm 1’s profit in a price sub-
game given a pair of location points. We also define Firm 2’s profit in the same
way because of symmetry. Since Firm 2’s profit pi2 is the total sum of profit
gained from C2 and C3, we define pi2 as follows.
pi2(p1, p2) = pi
C2
2 (p2) + pi
C3
2 (p1, p2) (5)
Now, we limit the range of x, y as follows
yx <
3
4
(1 + x) (6)
Lemma 1. When (6) holds, in an equilibrium of a price subgame corresponding
to a pair of location points, Firm 1 does not choose a price such that p1 > 1−z
2
1.
Proof. Given z1, z2, we fix Firm 2’s strategy in a price subgame. We must
show that the total sum of profit gained from C1 and C3 when it charges the
price 1− z21 is greater than the profit gained from C3 when it charges the price
p1 > 1− z
2
1 .
Let ρ denote the probability of C3 purchasing Firm 1’s product when Firm
1 charges p1. Let ρ
∗ denote the probability of C3 purchasing Firm 1’s product
when Firm 1 charges 1− z21 .
Since p1 > 1− z
2
1, we obtain ρ ≤ ρ
∗. Here we show that p1ρx < (1− z
2
1)(1+
ρ∗x). When ρ = 0, this equation is obvious. Suppose ρ > 0. Then, p1 ≤ y must
hold. Now, by (6), we obtain
(1− z21)(1 + ρ
∗x)− p1ρx ≥ ρ(1− z
2
1) + [ρ
∗(1− z21)− ρp1]x
≥ρ[(1− z21)(1 + x)− p1x] ≥ ρ[(1− z
2
1)(1 + x)− yx] > 0
We have shown this lemma for Firm 1. Because of symmetry, we can show
that Firm 2 does not charge a price such that p2 > 1−(1−z2)
2 in an equilibrium
in a price subgame.
3 Price Game
In this section, we characterize an equilibrium profit in a price subgame cor-
responding to all pairs of (z1, z2). Because of symmetry at 1/2, without loss
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of generality, it is sufficient for us to focus on the case of z1 + z2 ≤ 1. In the
following, we focus on a mixed strategy equilibrium when both z1 and z2 are
near to 1/2. These include equilibria of Varian’s model of price dispersion in
which product differentiation is explicitly considered. However, according to a
location pair that chooses their locations, a pure strategy equilibrium exists in
a price subgame. See Appendix A for more details.
First, we characterize an equilibrium profit. When both z1 and z2 are close
to 1/2, the following equations are satisfied,{
1− z21 < {y − (1/2− z1)
2}(1 + x),
1− (1− z2)
2 < {y − (1/2− z2)
2}(1 + x).
(7)
Let (pi∗1 , pi
∗
2) be an equilibrium profit vector, which is fixed in this price
subgame. Let p¯∗i be the upper bound of firm i’s strategy in this equilibrium and
p∗
i
be the lower bound of firm i’s strategy in this equilibrium.
We show pi∗1 = 1 − z
2
1 . Intuitively, initially, we find that Firm 1 does not
charge p1 > 1−z
2
1 because it might lose its own fan and, moreover, we show that
Firm 1 sets p∗
1
≥ (1 − z21)/(1 + x). Finally, we determine that the equilibrium
profit of Firm 1 is pi∗1 = 1 − z
2
1 . Once we determine the lower bound of the
support of Firm 1’s strategy and its equilibrium profit, we also determine Firm
2’s lower bound p∗
2
.We then obtain pi∗2 . See Appendix B for more details.
Now, we show that the equilibrium profit of each firm is determined uniquely,
(pi∗1 , pi
∗
2) = (1−z
2
1 , 1− z
2
1+
[
(1/2− z1)
2 − (1/2− z2)
2
]
(1+x)). Here, we obtain
the next proposition.
Proposition 1.
(pi∗1 , pi
∗
2) = (1− z
2
1 , 1− z
2
1 + [(1/2− z1)
2 − (1/2− z2)
2](1 + x)).
Proof. By Lemma 6-7, we obtain this result. See Appendix B for more details.
However, each firm cannot obtain this profit in a pure strategy equilibrium.
In the following, we show a mixed strategy equilibrium for firms to obtain this
equilibrium profit.
Proposition 2. If {
1− z21 < {y − (1/2− z1)
2}(1 + x),
y − (1/2− z2)
2 < 1− (1− z2)
2
holds, then, an equilibrium exists such that the equilibrium strategy of each firm
is
F 1∗(p) =


0, if p ≤
1−z2
1
1+x ,
1−
pi∗
2
−(p+T1)
(p+T1)x
, if p ∈ [
1−z2
1
1+x , y − (1/2− z1)
2],
F 1∗(y − (1/2− z1)
2), if p ∈ [y − (1/2− z1)
2, 1− z21),
1, if p ≥ 1− z21 .
(8)
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F 2∗(p) =


0, if p ≤
1−z2
1
1+x + T1,
1−
pi∗
1
−(p−T1)
(p−T1)x
, if p ∈ [
1−z2
1
1+x + T1, y − (1/2− z2)
2),
1, if p ≥ y − (1/2− z2)
2.
(9)
where T1 = (1/2 − z1)
2 − (1/2 − z2)
2 ≥ 0. In this equilibrium, each firm’s
equilibrium profit is pi∗1 = 1−z
2
1 , pi
∗
2 = 1−z
2
1+{(1/2−z1)
2− (1/2−z2)
2}(1+x).
Proof. See Appendix C.
Remark 1. Equilibrium strategies shown by Proposition 2 involve symmetric
location pairs. At symmetric location pairs, a symmetric equilibrium strategy
profile exists where equilibrium profit is equal to equilibrium profit in an asym-
metric equilibrium. For example, an equilibrium exists such that
F 1∗(p) =


0, if p ≤
1−z2
1
1+x ,
1−
pi∗
2
−p
px , if p ∈ [
1−z2
1
1+x , y − (1/2− z1)
2],
F 1∗(y − (1/2− z1)
2), if p ∈ [y − (1/2− z1)
2, 1− z21),
1, if p ≥ 1− z21 .
F 2∗(p) =


0, if p ≤ 1−(1−z2)
2
1+x ,
1−
pi∗
1
−p
px , if p ∈ [
1−(1−z2)
2
1+x , y − (1/2− z2)
2),
F 2∗(y − (1/2− z2)
2), if p ∈ [y − (1/2− z2)
2, 1− (1− z2)
2),
1, if p ≥ 1− (1 − z2)
2.
Proposition 3. If {
1− z21 < {y − (1/2− z1)
2}(1 + x),
1− (1 − z2)
2 ≤ y − (1/2− z2)
2
holds, then an equilibrium exists such that the equilibrium strategy of each firm
is
F 1∗(p) =


0, if p ≤
1−z2
1
1+x ,
1−
pi∗
2
−(p+T1)
(p+T1)x
, if p ∈ [
1−z2
1
1+x , 1− (1 − z2)
2 − T1],
F (1− (1− z2)
2 − T1), if p ∈ [1− (1− z2)
2 − T1, 1− z
2
1),
1, if p ≥ 1− z21 .
F 2∗(p) =


0, if p ≤
1−z2
1
1+x + T1,
1−
pi∗
1
−(p−T1)
(p−T1)x
, if p ∈ [
1−z2
1
1+x + T1, 1− (1− z2)
2),
1, if p2 ≥ 1− (1− z2)
2
where T1 = (1/2 − z1)
2 − (1/2 − z2)
2 ≥ 0. In this equilibrium, each firm’s
equilibrium profit is pi∗1 = 1 − z
2
1, and pi
∗
2 = 1 − z
2
1 + {(1/2 − z1)
2 − (1/2 −
z2)
2}(1 + x).
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Proof. In an equilibrium, pi∗i , (i = 1, 2) is constant regardless of the selected
strategy. This is the same as we have shown for Proposition 2. We show that
strategy profiles are an equilibrium. By pi∗1 = 1− z
2
1 , Firm 1 does not deviate to
a price strictly lower than
1−z2
1
1+x . Because Firm 1’s lower bound of support for
its equilibrium strategy is
1−z2
1
1+x , it does not follow that Firm 2 charges a price
strictly lower than
1−z2
1
1+x + T1, which is the lower bound of its strategy support.
Next, we show that Firm 1 does not deviate, choosing a price p˙1 such that
1− (1− z1)
2−T1 < p˙1 < 1− z
2
1 . Supposing that F
2∗(p) is given, it follows with
a probability of 1 that Firm 2’s price charged to C3 including transport costs is
strictly lower than Firm 1’s price. Thus, only C1 purchases Firm 1’s product.
On the other hand, in this case, Firm 1’s profit is strictly lower than pi∗1 . Thus,
Firm 1 does not deviate.
Lemma 2.
1− z21 + [(1/2− z1)
2 − (1/2− z2)
2](1 + x) > 1− (1− z2)
2, if z1 + z2 < 1,
1− z21 + [(1/2− z1)
2 − (1/2− z2)
2](1 + x) = 1− (1− z2)
2, if z1 + z2 = 1.
Proof. We obtain the result immediately from (25)
Lemma 3. If 1− z21 < {y − (1/2− z1)
2}(1 + x) is satisfied, then
{y − (1/2− z2)
2}(1 + x) > 1− z21 + [(1/2− z1)
2 − (1/2− z2)
2](1 + x).
Proof. Given that condition 1−z21 < {y−(1/2−z1)
2}(1+x) holds, we determine
that 1 − z21 + [(1/2 − z1)
2 − (1/2 − z2)
2](1 + x) < {y − (1/2 − z1)
2}(1 + x) +
[(1/2− z1)
2 − (1/2− z2)
2](1 + x) = {y − (1/2− z2)
2}(1 + x).
Remark 2. We consider an implication of T as follows. In a price subgame
where z1 + z2 ≤ 1 holds, Firm 2 is located close to C3 while Firm 1 is located
close to its monopoly market. Firm 1 gains at most its monopoly profit because
it is located further away from C3 than Firm 2.
On the other hand, by z1 + z2 < 1, Firm 2 gains greater profit than Firm 1
by {(1/2− z1)
2 − (1/2− z2)
2}(1+ x) > 0 because Firm 2 is located closer to C3
than Firm 1.
Moreover, by Lemma 2, Firm 2’s profit fails to achieve the maximum level it
could achieve at its present location if it plays as a monopolist at this location.
However, by Lemma 3, Firm 2’s profit fails to achieve the maximum profit that
it gains at its present location if it plays as a monopolist at this location.
This is because the competitive effect of Firm 1’s behavior entails a rent that
Firm 2 enjoys.
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4 Location Game
Let Πi(z1, z2) denote firm i’s profit in a location game.
Π1(z1, z2) =


1− z21 , if z1 ∈ [0, z¯1],
(y − (1/2− z1)
2)(1 + x), if z1 ∈ [z¯1, 1/2], z2 ∈ [z¯2, 1],
1− z21 , if z1 ∈ [z¯1, 1/2], z2 ∈ [1/2, z¯2], z1 + z2 ≤ 1,
1− (1− z2)
2 + T2(1 + x), if z1 ∈ [z¯1, 1/2], z2 ∈ [1/2, z¯2], z1 + z2 > 1,
(10)
Π2(z1, z2) =


1− (1− z2)
2, if z2 ∈ [z¯2, 1],
(y − (1/2− z2)
2)(1 + x), if z1 ∈ [0, z¯1], z2 ∈ [1/2, z¯2],
1− (1− z2)
2, if z1 ∈ [z¯1, 1/2], z2 ∈ [1/2, z¯2], z1 + z2 ≥ 1,
1− z21 + T1(1 + x), if z1 ∈ [z¯1, 1/2], z2 ∈ [1/2, z¯2], z1 + z2 < 1.
(11)
, where Tj = (1/2− zj)
2 − (1/2− zi)
2, (i = 1, 2, j 6= i).
In this section, we consider symmetric location equilibrium. First, we show
that equilibrium pay-offs in all equilibrium location pairs are identical, that is,
equal to 1.
Proposition 4. Equilibrium pay-offs for any subgame perfect equilibrium of
this game are equal to 1.
Proof. Firm 1 gains a profit Π1 = 1 with a probability of 1 if it is located at
z1 = 0. It follows that equilibrium profit is not strictly less than 1. Suppose that
Firm 1 gains a profit strictly greater than 1. If Firm 1 is located at z˜1, which
is the left edge of its location strategy, it follows from the discussion above that
its profit is 1− z˜21 . However, this profit is less than 1. Because of continuity in
profit functions in all location points, Firm 1 cannot gain an equilibrium profit
greater than 1 that is approximately z˜1. Thus, Firm 1 cannot gain a profit
strictly greater than 1 in an equilibrium.
In the following, we consider the case of y(1 + x) ≥ 1. We show that a
symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium exists in this case.
Mixed Strategy Equilibrium 1 We consider equilibrium location pairs
when x, y is such that (y − 1/4)(1 + x) > 1. It follows by (7) that zˆ1, zˆ2 does
not exist. Thus, we obtain pay-off functions as follows,
Π1(z1, z2) =
{
1− z21 , if z1 + z2 ≤ 1,
1− (1− z2)
2 + T2(1 + x), if z1 + z2 > 1.
(12)
Π2(z1, z2) =
{
1− (1 − z2)
2, if z1 + z2 ≥ 1,
1− z21 + T1(1 + x), if z1 + z2 < 1.
(13)
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The closer a firm is located to 1/2, the more profit it gains when it is located
asymmetrically with respect to the other firm. However, both firms do obtain
at most their own monopoly profits at symmetric location pairs. Thus, since(
1
2 ,
1
2
)
is not a best response pair, it follows that an equilibrium location pair
does not exist using a pure strategy. In the following, we present an equilibrium
location pair using a mixed strategy.
Given Firm 2’s strategy G2(z2), the expected pay-off of Firm 1 when located
at z1 is given by the following:
E[Π1] =
∫ 1−z1
1/2
(1− z21)g2(z2)dz2
+
∫ 1
1−z1
[
1− (1 − z2)
2 + {(1/2− z2)
2 − (1/2− z1)
2}(1 + x)
]
g2(z2)dz2,
(14)
where g2(z2) denotes the density function of a distribution function G2.
Proposition 5. Let x, y satisfy (y − 1/4)(1 + x) > 1. Then, a mixed strategy
equilibrium exists such that the equilibrium strategy of each firm is
G∗1(z1) =
2z1
x(1− 2z1) + 1
, 0 ≤ z1 ≤ 1/2,
G∗2(z2) =
(2z2 − 1)(1 + x)
x(2z2 − 1) + 1
, 1/2 ≤ z2 ≤ 1,
where G∗2(z2) is a distribution function because G
∗
2
′ > 0, G∗2(
1
2 ) = 0, and G
∗
2(1) =
1. G∗1(z1) is a distribution function for similar reasons.
Proof. We show that for any given G∗2(z2), Firm 1 gains an expected profit equal
to 1 when it is located at z1 ∈ [0, 1/2]. Substituting G
∗
2 into (14), by partial
integration for the second term of this equation, we obtain
E[Π∗1] = (1− z
2
1)[G
∗
2(z2)]
1−z1
1/2
+
[
[1− (1 − z2)
2 + {(1/2− z2)
2 − (1/2− z1)
2}(1 + x)]G∗2(z2)
]1
1−z1
−
∫ 1
1−z1
[1− (1− z2)
2 + {(1/2− z2)
2 − (1/2− z1)
2}(1 + x)]′G∗2(z2)dz2
= 1 + (1/4− (1/2− z1)
2)(1 + x) − (1 + x)
∫ 1
1−z1
(2z2 − 1)dz2
= 1 + (1/4− (1/2− z1)
2)(1 + x) − (1 + x)
[(
z2 −
1
2
)2]1
1−z1
= 1.
By symmetry, we obtain the same result for Firm 2 in the same way.
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Mixed Strategy Equilibrium 2 Next, we consider the case where x, y lies
in the region where both y(1 + x) ≥ 1 and (y − 1/4)(1 + x) ≤ 1 hold. This
region is characterized by z¯. (10)-(11) denotes the respective pay-offs for Firms
1 and 2. In this case, we construct an equilibrium using G∗ obtained through
Proposition 5. Now, we consider zˆ2, which satisfies
(1− (1 − zˆ2)
2)G∗2(zˆ2) + {1−G
∗
2(zˆ2)}
{
y − (zˆ2 − 1/2)
2
}
(1 + x) = 1 (15)
Solving (6), we obtain the following:
zˆ2 =
1
2
+ 2
(
y −
1
1 + x
)
.
Now, from y(1 + x) ≥ 1, it follows that y − 11+x ≥ 0 and, then, it follows that
1/2 ≤ zˆ2.
Next, we show zˆ2 ≤ z¯2. From the definition of z¯2, we obtain (y − (1/2 −
z¯2)
2)(1 + x) = 1 − (1 − z¯2)
2. The left-hand side of this equation is monotone
decreasing with respect to z¯2 while the right-hand side is monotone increasing.
Thus, in the following, we show that (y − (1/2− zˆ2)
2)(1 + x) ≥ 1− (1 − zˆ2)
2.
By (y − (zˆ2 − 1/2)
2)(1 + x) = 1 + 12 (1 − zˆ2)(2zˆ2 − 1)(1 + x), we determine
that 12 (1− zˆ2)(2zˆ2 − 1)(1 + x) > −(1− zˆ2)
2 and, thus, zˆ2 ≤ z¯2.
In the same way, by symmetry, we show that zˆ1 =
1
2 − 2
(
y − 11+x
)
.
Using zˆ2, we show that a symmetric equilibrium exists such that Firm 2
plays a mixed strategy, which is the same as G∗2 on the support [1/2, zˆ2] while
the remainder of the probability, 1−G∗2, is attached to being located at z2 = 1.
Given this strategy of Firm 2, E[Π1] denotes the expected profit of Firm 1
for all points z1 on the interval [1 − zˆ2, 1/2]. We conclude that
E[Π1] =
∫ 1−z1
1/2
(1− z21)g2(z2)dz2
+
∫ zˆ2
1−z1
[1− (1− z2)
2 +
{
(1/2− z2)
2 − (1/2− z1)
2
}
(1 + x)]g2(z2)dz2
+ {1−G2(zˆ2)}
{
y − (1/2− z1)
2
}
(1 + x), (16)
where g2(z2) denotes the density function of the distribution function G2.
Proposition 6. Let x, y satisfy both y(1 + x) ≥ 1 and (y − 1/4)(1 + x) ≤ 1.
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Then, an equilibrium exists such that each firm plays.
G∗∗1 (z1) =


0, if z1 < 0,
2zˆ1
x(1 − 2zˆ1) + 1
, if 0 ≤ z1 ≤ zˆ1,
2z1
x(1 − 2z1) + 1
, if zˆ1 ≤ z1 ≤ 1/2,
G∗∗2 (z2) =


(2z2 − 1)(1 + x)
x(2z2 − 1) + 1
, if 1/2 ≤ z2 ≤ zˆ2,
(2zˆ2 − 1)(1 + x)
x(2zˆ2 − 1) + 1
, if zˆ2 ≤ z2 < 1,
1, if 1 ≤ z2.
Proof. See Appendix C.
Pure Strategy Equilibrium When y is relatively small, C3 consumers do
not want to purchase any products because they do not feel sufficiently attracted
to the products. This is the reason firms sell products that have a distinctive
characteristic recognized by loyal consumers. This situation can occur when
C3 is a large market but the reservation value y is sufficiently small. Thus, it
appears that C3 does not exist. Finally, we characterize this type of subgame
as a perfect equilibrium.
Proposition 7. When x, y satisfies 1 > y(1 + x), we have a subgame perfect
equilibrium such that
z∗1 = 0, z
∗
2 = 1.
Proof. Firm 1 gains a profit max{1−z21, (y−(1/2−z1)
2)(1+x)} when it is located
at z1. Given z
∗
1 = 0, z
∗
2 = 1, suppose that Firm 1 deviates to z1 ∈ (0, 1/2].
Because of 1 > y(1 + x), Firm 1 gains a profit strictly less than 1. Therefore,
Firm 1 never deviates. Because of symmetry, we show this is the same for Firm
2. Thus, z∗1 = 0, z
∗
2 = 1 is a subgame perfect location pair.
Remark 3. If y(1+x) ≥ 1 is satisfied, an asymmetric pure strategy equilibrium
exists such that (z∗1 , z
∗
2) =
(
0, 12
)
or
(
1
2 , 1
)
. This corresponds to the region men-
tioned in Proposition 5 and 6. If (y − 1/4)(1 + x) ≤ 1 is satisfied, firms behave
in the same manner as they would in a monopoly. That is, a firm located at 0 or
1 maximizes its own monopoly profit while a firm located at 1/2 maximizes the
profit that it gains from both its own fans and C3 consumers. Thus, the firms do
not deviate. If (y − 1/4)(1 + x) > 1 is satisfied, because a firm located at either
0 or 1 is always far away from 1/2 whichever way it moves, it cannot gain a
strictly higher profit than monopoly profit. Thus, the firm does not deviate. On
the other hand, given the strategy of a firm that specializes in its own fans, a
firm located at 1/2 loses its rent, mentioned in Remark 2, when it moves from
1/2 to another location. Thus, this firm does not deviate.
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5 Conclusions and Remarks
We consider a model that incorporates a spatial competition framework a` la
Hotelling (1929) where firms compete in price and location in Varian’s model
of sales.
We show that the difference between each firm’s choice of location in a
subgame perfect equilibrium will be neither purely maximized at both ends of a
line nor purely minimized at the center. In our model, these two typical results
stochastically occur in a subgame perfect equilibrium.
Here, we consider why firms’ choice of locations is randomized. Discontin-
uous games are analyzed by a mixed strategy equilibrium. However, in our
model, a pay-off function for location points z is continuous at the point where
both firms’ products are of equal value for the informed C3. Thus, we find that
“dispersion” is not caused by discontinuity in profit functions with regard to z.
On the other hand, Varian’s model of sales is also characterized by a pay-off
discontinuity, which is caused by discontinuous demands. In our model, each
firm has its own fans, that is, the firms shield a part of their own markets while
engaging in a Bertrand competition over the informed who are located at 1/2 in
the interval. At the same time, in this market, firms cannot set two-part prices,
one for their fans and one to attract the informed switchers. This structure is
the same as the relationship between informed and uninformed consumers in
Varian’s model. This is the reason a pay-off discontinuity occurs in the profits
arising in the pricing subgame of our model. This discontinuity in profits causes
price dispersion in a price subgame, just as sales arise in Varian’s model. This is
the reason why Varian’s similar result holds even when firm location is explicitly
included.
However, for the first-stage game truncated by backward induction, a pay-
off function for characteristic Z is continuous at the point where both firms’
products are of equal value to the switchers. Therefore, the occurrence of ran-
domization in a choice of product characteristics is not caused by discontinuity
in profit functions for the choice of characteristics. Thus we find that the ex-
istence of “fans” is key to the cause of “dispersion” of product differentiation.
This result is caused by the explicit introduction of choice in characteristics into
Varian’s model of sales.
Moreover, unlike Varian’s model, we show that by explicitly introducing lo-
cation choice, it is possible for a firm to gain excess profit in a price competitive
market. However, from Proposition 4, firms’ expected profit in a subgame per-
fect equilibrium is set as the maximum monopoly profit, equal to one. Thus,
even when product differentiation is explicitly introduced into a Varian-type
model, Varian’s implication can be retained; the opportunity for profit in an
informed market is lost with competition.
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A Pure strategy equilibriums
In the following, we consider pure strategy equilibriums. In each case, we show
that an equilibrium profit in a subgame is unique.
First, these cases are classified according to whether z1 is close to 1/2 or far
from 1/2. When z1 is far from 1/2, Firm 1 gains a higher profit when it sells a
product to C1 only compared to when it sells to both C1 and C3. We consider
the case of 1 − z21 ≥ {y − (1/2 − z1)
2}(1 + x). When z1 is close to 1/2, the
definition is inverted.
Now, we define z¯1, which is given by evaluating (y−(1/2−z1)
2)(1+x) = 1−z21
for z1. By z¯1 ∈ [0, 1/2],
z¯1 =
1
2
−
√
(x− 1)2 + 4x(y − 1/4)(1 + x) − 1
2x
.
Remark 4. For all z1, (y − (1/2 − z1)
2)(1 + x) > 1 − z21 if and only if (y −
1/4)(1 + x) > 1. Therefore, z¯1 does not exist if (y − 1/4)(1 + x) > 1. Now, we
assume that x ≥ 1. Moreover, it follows that if z¯1 exists, then, y ≤ 3/4.
Because of symmetry, we define z¯2 in the same way.
z¯2 =
1
2
+
√
(x− 1)2 + 4x(y − 1/4)(1 + x) − 1
2x
.
Here, we fix case z1 ∈ [0, z¯1] where z1 is far from 1/2. We classify the
following two cases according to the distance between z2 and 1/2. At first, z2
is also far from 1/2, that is, z2 ∈ [z¯2, 1]. Thus, z2 satisfies 1 − (1 − z2)
2 ≥
{y − (1/2− z2)
2}(1 + x) (Proposition 8). Next, only z2 is close to 1/2, that is,
z2 ∈ [1/2, z¯2). Therefore, z2 satisfies 1 − (1 − z2)
2 < {y − (1/2 − z2)
2}(1 + x)
(Proposition 9).
When for all z1 ∈ (z¯1, 1/2], 1− z
2
1 < {y− (1/2− z1)
2}(1 + x) is satisfied, z1
is close to 1/2. Given the condition z1 + z2 ≤ 1 mentioned above, we focus on
the case where z2 is also close to 1/2, that is, z2 ∈ [1/2, z¯2), which follows from
1− (1− z2)
2 < {y− (1/2− z2)
2}(1 + x). We have already considered this case.
(See also Proposition 1 and Appendix B.)
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Proposition 8. If
1− z21 ≥ {y − (1/2− z1)
2}(1 + x), (17)
1− (1− z2)
2 ≥ {y − (1/2− z2)
2}(1 + x) (18)
holds, then the equilibrium profit vector is (1 − z21 , 1− (1 − z2)
2), and its profit
is unique.
Proof. Firm 1’s maximized profit gained from C1 only is higher than the maxi-
mum profit gained from both C1 and C3.
Thus, we obtain maxp1,p2 pi1(p1, p2) = 1− z
2
1 . Therefore, in an equilibrium,
Firm 1 never obtains a strictly higher profit than 1− z21 .
Next, Firm 1 obtains 1−z21 whenever it charges p1 = 1−z
2
1 for any p2. Thus,
in an equilibrium, Firm 1 never obtains strictly less than 1−z21 . Similarly, Firm
2 never obtains a profit other than 1− (1 − z2)
2 in an equilibrium. Here, price
profile (1− z21, 1− (1− z2)
2) enables each firm to obtain maximum profit. Thus,
this profile is a unique equilibrium.
Remark 5. Proposition 8 shows that an equilibrium profit is unique in a price
subgame. However, there may be more than one equilibrium, that is, an equi-
librium strategy that achieves an equilibrium profit is not always unique. For
example, when
1− z21 = {y − (1/2− z1)
2}(1 + x), (19)
1− (1 − z2)
2 > {y − (1/2− z2)
2}(1 + x) (20)
hold. It follows by (20) that a price vector 1− (1− z2)
2 is a dominant strategy
of Firm 2. On the other hand, if Firm 2 chooses 1 − (1 − z2)
2, it follows by
(19) that Firm 1 is indifferent to both 1 − z21 and y − (1/2 − z1)
2. Thus, we
find that all the strategy pairs are equilibria where Firm 1 uses a mixed strategy
that combines 1− z21 with y− (1/2− z1)
2 at any ratio it likes if Firm 2 chooses
1− (1− z2)
2.
Proposition 9. If
1− z21 ≥ {y − (1/2− z1)
2}(1 + x), (21)
1− (1− z2)
2 < {y − (1/2− z2)
2}(1 + x) (22)
hold. Then, the equilibrium profit is unique and this equilibrium profit is (1 −
z21 , {y − (1/2− z2)
2}(1 + x))
Proof. We show Firm 1’s profit. By (21), we obtain maxp1,p2 pi1(p1, p2) = 1 −
z21 ≥ {y− (1/2− z1)
2}(1 + x). Thus, in an equilibrium, Firm 1 never obtains a
strictly higher profit than 1− z21 . Moreover, Firm 1 obtains 1− z
2
1 whenever it
charges p1 = 1 − z
2
1 for any p2. Thus, in an equilibrium, Firm 1 never obtains
strictly less than 1− z21 .
In an equilibrium, Firm 1 never chooses a price other than 1 − z21 and y −
(1/2 − z1)
2. Next we show that Firm 1 never chooses y − (1/2 − z1)
2 at any
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positive probability in an equilibrium. If Firm 1 plays a mixed strategy profile
in which it chooses either y − (1/2 − z1)
2 at a positive probability η > 0 or
1− z21 at a positive probability 1− η > 0, Firm 2 does not have a best response
to the strategy of Firm 1. This is because by (22), if Firm 2 chooses a price
y − (1/2 − z2)
2 − ε, (ε > 0) because of Remark 4, it obtains both C2 and C3
and gains a profit {y − (1/2 − z2)
2 − ε}(1 + x). However, if Firm 2 chooses
y− (1/2− z2)
2, it obtains at most {y− (1/2− z2)
2}(1+x/2) because the prices
of both firms, including transportation costs, are equal for C3.
Thus, in an equilibrium, Firm 1 chooses a price of 1 − z21 at probability
1. Given this strategy of Firm 1, by (22), Firm 2’s best response is uniquely
determined. Therefore, a unique equilibrium (1−z21 , y−(1/2−z2)
2) exists. Thus,
a unique equilibrium profit (1− z21 , {y− (1/2− z2)
2}(1+ x)) is determined.
B Uniqueness of equilibrium profit
Lemma 4. pi∗1 ≥ 1− z
2
1 .
Proof. Firm 1 obtains a profit 1− z21 whenever it chooses p1 = 1− z
2
1 for any of
Firm 2’s strategies. If pi∗1 < 1 − z
2
1 , Firm 1 increases its profit to 1− z
2
1 . Thus,
this is contradictory to an equilibrium.
Lemma 5. If pi∗1 > 1− z
2
1 then p
∗
1
>
1−z2
1
1+x .
Proof. If pi∗1 > 1− z
2
1 and p
∗
1
≤
1−z2
1
1+x , Firm 1 obtains at most 1− z
2
1 + (1 + x)ε
when it chooses p∗
1
+ ε, (ε > 0). This profit is strictly less than pi∗1 when ε→ 0.
Therefore, this is contradictory to a definition of p∗
1
, which is the lower bound
of support of an equilibrium strategy.
Lemma 6.
pi∗1 = 1− z
2
1 .
Proof. If pi∗1 > 1− z
2
1 holds, then, it follows by (7) and Lemma5 that a positive
number ε exists such that
p∗
1
− ε >
1− z21
1 + x
, (23)
1− (1− z2)
2
1 + x
+ ε < min{1− (1− z2)
2, y − (1/2− z2)
2}. (24)
holds.
Now, we consider Firm 2’s profit when it chooses
p˜2 =
1− (1− z2)
2
1 + x
+ ε
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for Firm 1’s strategy. By (23),
p∗
1
+ (1/2− z1)
2 − [p˜2 + (1/2− z2)
2]
= p∗
1
− ε−
1− (1− z2)
2
1 + x
+ (1/2− z1)
2 − (1/2− z2)
2
>
1− z21
1 + x
−
1− (1− z2)
2
1 + x
+ (1/2− z1)
2 − (1/2− z2)
2 ≥ 0 (25)
are satisfied. Thus, we have p∗
1
+ (1/2− z1)
2 > p˜2 + (1/2− z2)
2. Additionally,
by (24), we find that Firm 2 gains a profit p˜2(1 + x) = 1− (1− z2)
2 + ε(1 + x)
from both C2 and C3. Thus, we have pi
∗
2 ≥ p˜2(1+x) > 1− (1− z2)
2. Therefore,
we obtain pi∗2 > 1− (1 − z2)
2, if pi∗1 > 1− z
2
1 .
Now, by Lemma 1, we have
p¯∗1 ≤ 1− z
2
1 .
Therefore, it suffices to show that p¯∗2 ≥ p¯
∗
1 + (1/2 − z1)
2 − (1/2 − z2)
2. If
p¯∗2 < p¯
∗
1 + (1/2 − z1)
2 − (1/2 − z2)
2, Firm 1 obtains at most 1 − z21 when it
chooses p¯∗1 because it never obtains C3. This is contradictory to pi
∗
1 > 1− z
2
1 .
Here, we find that pi∗2 > 1 − (1 − z2)
2 is inconsistent with p¯∗2 > p¯
∗
1 + (1/2−
z1)
2 − (1/2− z2)
2. This is because Firm 2 obtains at most 1 − (1 − z2)
2 when
it chooses p¯∗2. Thus, we obtain p¯
∗
2 = p¯
∗
1 + (1/2− z1)
2 − (1/2− z2)
2.
Assuming that Firm 1 does not choose p¯∗1 with a positive probability, Firm
2 obtains at most 1 − (1 − z2)
2 when it chooses p¯∗2. This is contradictory to
pi∗2 > 1 − (1 − z2)
2. In the same way, if Firm 2 does not choose p¯∗2 with a
positive probability, Firm 1 obtains at most 1 − z21 when it chooses p¯
∗
1. This
is contradictory to pi∗1 > 1 − z
2
1 . Thus, both firms choose p¯
∗
i with a positive
probability.
Let F i(p) be a probability distribution function when firm i chooses a price
less than p. We define Firm 1’s profit as follows when Firm 1 chooses p¯∗1,
p¯∗1
[
1 +
{
1− lim
ε→0
F 2(p¯∗2 − ε)
} x
2
]
. (26)
If Firm 1 chooses p¯∗1 − ε, it obtains at least
(p¯∗1 − ε)
[
1 +
{
1− lim
ε→0
F 2(p¯∗2 − ε)
}
x
]
. (27)
If ε → 0, then (26) < (27). This is contradictory to an optimality that Firm 1
chooses p¯∗1 with a positive probability. Thus, we obtain pi
∗
1 = 1− z
2
1 .
Lemma 7.
pi∗2 = 1− z
2
1 + [(1/2− z1)
2 − (1/2− z2)
2](1 + x).
Proof. By Lemma 6, pi∗1 = 1− z
2
1 . We obtain
p∗
1
≥
1− z21
1 + x
.
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Assuming that pi∗2 > 1 − z
2
1 + [(1/2 − z1)
2 − (1/2 − z2)
2](1 + x), we obtain
p∗
2
>
1−z2
1
1+x + (1/2 − z1)
2 − (1/2 − z2)
2. However, given this strategy of Firm
2, Firm 1 always obtains a profit pi1 > 1 − z
2
1 = pi
∗
1 . This is because Firm 1
can always charge a price of p1 ∈ (
1−z2
1
1+x , p
∗
2
+ (1/2 − z2)
2 − (1/2 − z1)
2) to C3
consumers, which is strictly higher than
1−z2
1
1+x and lower than the lower bound
of Firm 2’s price p∗
2
+ (1/2 − z2)
2, which includes transportation costs. Thus,
Firm 1 increases its profit when it deviates to a price p1 in this open interval.
This is contradictory to pi∗1 being the maximum profit.
Thus, we determine that if pi∗1 = 1 − z
2
1 , then pi
∗
2 ≤ 1 − z
2
1 + [(1/2 − z1)
2 −
(1/2− z2)
2](1 + x).
Next, we show that it is not the case that pi∗2 < 1−z
2
1 +[(1/2−z1)
2− (1/2−
z2)
2](1 + x). Assuming that pi∗2 < 1− z
2
1 + [(1/2− z1)
2 − (1/2− z2)
2](1 + x), if
Firm 2 chooses
p˙2 =
1− z21
1 + x
+ (1/2− z1)
2 − (1/2− z2)
2 − ε,
it obtains C3 because p˙2 satisfies p
∗
1
+ (1/2 − z1)
2 > p˙2 + (1/2 − z2)
2 and
y − (p˙2 + (1/2 − z2)
2) = y −
1−z2
1
1+x − (1/2 − z1)
2 + ε > 0 is satisfied. Here, by
(7), ε > 0 is chosen as being satisfied by y −
1−z2
1
1+x − (1/2− z1)
2 + ε > 0.
Now, by x ≥ 1, we obtain
1−z2
1
1+x + (1/2− z1)
2 ≤ 1− (1− z2)
2 + (1/2− z2)
2.
Because the left-hand side of the equation is at most 3/4, the minimum of the
right-hand side is 3/4. Thus, C2 purchases Firm 2’s product because 1 − (1 −
z2)
2 − p˙2 ≥ ε > 0.
Therefore, we obtain Firm 2’s profit as follows,
p˙i2 = p˙2(1 + x) = 1− z
2
1 + [(1/2− z1)
2 − (1/2− z2)
2](1 + x)− ε(1 + x).
However, this contradicts the definition that pi∗2 is the maximum profit because
an ε exists such that pi∗2 < p˙i2 when we take a small enough ε.
Thus, we obtain pi∗2 = 1 − z
2
1 + [(1/2 − z1)
2 − (1/2 − z2)
2](1 + x) if pi∗1 =
1− z21 .
C Another proofs
Proof of Proposition 2. We show that for any of given Firm 2’s mixed strategies,
Firm 1 gains a constant expected profit when it adopts a strategy that belongs
to the support of its strategy. Given F 2∗(p) of Firm 2, Firm 1 charges p1 ∈
[
1−z2
1
1+x , y − (1/2− z1)
2), Firm 1 gains an expected profit
p1 + p1x(1− F
2∗(p1 + T1)) = p1 + p1x
(
pi∗1 − p1
p1x
)
= pi∗1
because Firm 1 obtains C3 consumers if Firm 2 charges p such that p > p1+T1
holds. Similarly, Firm 2’s expected profit is pi∗2 when it charges p2 ∈ [
1−z2
1
1+x +
21
T1, y − (1/2 − z2)
2] because Firm 2 obtains C3 consumers if Firm 1 charges p
such that p > p2 − T1 holds.
Now, we show that (8)-(9) is an equilibrium strategy profile. By pi∗1 = 1−z
2
1,
Firm 1 does not deviate to a price strictly lower than
1−z2
1
1+x .
1−z2
1
1+x is the lower
bound of Firm 1’s support of its strategy. Thus Firm 2 never charges a price
strictly lower than
1−z2
1
1+x + T1, which is the lower bound of Firm 2’s strategy
support.
Next, we show that Firm 1 never deviates to a price p˙1 such that y− (1/2−
z1)
2 < p˙1 < 1−z
2
1 holds. If Firm 1 charges p˙1, then, it obtains only C1 consumers
and cannot obtain C3 consumers because p˙1 has exceeded the reservation price
of C3 consumers. Thus, Firm 1 obtains a strictly lower profit than 1 − z
2
1 if it
charges p˙1 Therefore, Firm 1 does not deviate.
Next, we show that Firm 1 never deviates to a price p¨1 = y− (1/2− z1)
2. If
Firm 1 charges p¨1, it does not obtain C3 consumers except when Firm 2 charges
p2 = y − (1/2 − z2)
2. In this case, the C3 market is divided equally between
both firms. Thus, we obtain Firm 1’s expected profit as follows.
p¨1
(
1 +
x
2
(
pi∗1 − p¨1
p¨1x
))
=
1
2
(p¨1 + pi
∗
1) .
However, by z1 + z2 ≤ 1 and y − (1/2 − z2)
2 < 1 − (1 − z2)
2, we obtain
1
2 (p¨1 + pi
∗
1) − pi
∗
1 =
1
2 (p¨1 − pi
∗
1) < 0. Thus, Firm 1 never deviates to a price
p¨1 = y − (1/2− z1)
2.
In the same way, we show that Firm 2 does not deviate to a price other than
p2 ∈ [
1−z2
1
1+x + T1, y − (1/2− z2)
2].
Proof of Proposition 6. It is sufficient to show Firm 1’s case because of symme-
try. We show that given G∗∗2 (z2), Firm 1 can gain an expected profit equal to 1
on either z1 = 0 or all z1 ∈ [1− zˆ2, 1/2] intervals.
Firm 1 can gain a profit equal to 1 at z1 = 0. Thus, it is sufficient to
show that Firm 1 gains an expected profit equal to 1 when it is located at any
z1 ∈ [1− zˆ2, 1/2] interval. Substituting G
∗∗
2 with (16), using partial integration,
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we have
E[Π∗1] = (1 − z
2
1)[G
∗∗
2 (z2)]
1−z1
1/2
+
[
[1− (1− z2)
2 + {(1/2− z2)
2 − (1/2− z1)
2}(1 + x)]G∗∗2 (z2)
]zˆ2
1−z1
−
∫ zˆ2
1−z1
[1− (1 − z2)
2 + {(1/2− z2)
2 − (1/2− z1)
2}(1 + x)]′G∗∗2 (z2)dz2
+ {1−G∗∗2 (zˆ2)}
{
y − (1/2− z1)
2
}
(1 + x)
=[1− (1− zˆ2)
2 + {(1/2− zˆ2)
2 − (1/2− z1)
2}(1 + x)]G∗∗2 (zˆ2)
−
∫ zˆ2
1−z1
{(2z2 − 1)x+ 1}G
∗∗
2 (z2)dz2
+ {1−G∗∗2 (zˆ2)}
{
y − (1/2− z1)
2
}
(1 + x)
=[1− (1− zˆ2)
2]G∗∗2 (zˆ2)
+ {1−G∗∗2 (zˆ2)}
{
y − (1/2− z1)
2
}
(1 + x)
+ [(1/2− zˆ2)
2 − (1/2− z1)
2](1 + x)G∗∗2 (zˆ2)
− (1 + x)[(z2 − 1/2)
2]zˆ21−z1
=[1− (1− zˆ2)
2]G∗∗2 (zˆ2)
+ {1−G∗∗2 (zˆ2)}
{
y − (1/2− z1)
2
}
(1 + x)
− {1−G∗∗2 (zˆ2)} [(1/2− zˆ2)
2 − (1/2− z1)
2](1 + x)
=[1− (1− zˆ2)
2]G∗∗2 (zˆ2) + {1−G
∗∗
2 (zˆ2)}
{
y − (zˆ2 − 1/2)
2
}
(1 + x) = 1.
Thus, the expected profit is constant in support of an equilibrium.
Finally, we show that for any given strategy of Firm 2, Firm 1 does not
choose z1 ∈ (0, zˆ1). Given G
∗∗
2 (zˆ2), Firm 1 does not deviate to z1 ∈ (0, z¯1]. This
is because Firm 1 gains 1− z˙21 < 1 when it is located on z˙1 ∈ (0, z¯1].
Given G∗∗2 (zˆ2), Firm 1 does not choose z1 ∈ (z¯1, zˆ1) when it uses a pure
strategy. Note that when 1− zˆ2 = zˆ1 holds, we have
(1− zˆ21)G
∗∗
2 (zˆ2) + {1−G
∗∗
2 (zˆ2)}
{
y − (zˆ1 − 1/2)
2
}
(1 + x) = 1.
Let f(z1) denote a firm 1’s profit when firm 1 chooses z1 ∈ (z¯1, zˆ1). We have
f(z1) = (1− z
2
1)G
∗∗
2 (zˆ2) + {1−G
∗∗
2 (zˆ2)}
{
y − (z1 − 1/2)
2
}
(1 + x). (28)
When derivatives of (28) are taken with respect to z1, we have
f ′(z1) = −2z1G
∗∗
2 (zˆ2) + {1−G
∗∗
2 (zˆ2)}(1− 2z1)(1 + x).
We determine that f ′′ = −2− 2(1−G)x < 0, and we have
f ′(zˆ1) = −2zˆ1G
∗∗
2 (zˆ2) + {1−G
∗∗
2 (zˆ2)}(1− 2zˆ1)(1 + x) = 0.
Thus, we determine that both f ′ ≥ 0 and f ′′ < 0 hold for all z1 ∈ [z¯1, zˆ1].
(28) is monotone increasing. Therefore, Firm 1 deviates to the left-hand side of
zˆ1.
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